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electoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on self-
employed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Theoretical and empirical research in political economy has linked policy making to 
electoral (opportunistic) and ideological (partisan) incentives (see e.g. Drazen, 2000, 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000 and Mueller, 2003, for reviews of this literature). 
Opportunistic motives reflect the incumbent party’s desire to win the elections and stay in 
office for as long as possible, while the partisan motives arise from assuming that voters 
have different preferences (e.g. over public goods), which leads to different policy 
platforms adopted by political parties that target the welfare of their constituency.  
 One strand in this literature has examined the effects of political ideology on the 
choice of the tax structure, as defined here by the distribution of the tax burden across 
factors of production and consumption (see e.g. the contributions by Persson and 
Tabellini, 1992 and 1994, Haufler, 1997 and Lockwood and Markis, 2006 and the survey 
paper by Winer and Hettich, 2003). The general conclusion from this body of work is that 
left-wing parties would, other things equal, prefer to tax capital income more relative to 
labor income, when compared to right-wing parties. Although this is an intuitive 
prediction and does conform to anecdotal evidence, we are not aware of an empirical 
investigation that examines whether political preferences affect the capital, labor and 
consumption tax rates differently.1 We are also not aware of an empirical investigation 
that examines whether opportunistic motives affect the capital, labor and consumption tax 
rates differently.2 This research is useful both in formally testing the predictions of 
theoretical models and in generating stylized facts regarding the political motives behind 
the choice of tax rates, with the hope of motivating new theoretical developments. 
                                                 
1 The existing empirical research has mainly examined whether there are partisan effects on the fiscal size 
of the government (i.e. on fiscal spending as a share of GDP and on the overall tax burden, as the latter is 
approximated by the share of tax revenue over GDP) and specific fiscal spending and/or tax-revenue 
categories (see e.g. Alesina et al., 1997, Cusack, 1997, Volkerink and de Haan, 2001a, Perotti and 
Kontopoulos, 2002 and Bräuninger, 2005 for the OECD and Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001 for Canadian 
provinces). Regarding empirical work on ideology effects on tax rates, we note the study on local property 
statutory tax rates for Dutch municipalities by Allers et al. (2001) and on the implicit income tax rate in the 
U.S. states by Reed (2006). Although the work by Reed (2006) is the closest to ours, we note that he does 
not examine differential effects on labor and capital income and does not consider opportunistic effects. 
Finally, Tavares (2004) and Mierau et al. (2007) suggest that political variables also matter for fiscal policy 
adjustment decisions. 
2 Note that the standard political business cycle literature (see e.g. the work by Nordhaus, 1975, Linbeck, 
1976 and Rogoff, 1990) implies that the incumbent party has the incentive to decrease the tax burden 
before elections, so as to increase the probability of being re-elected. However, the – theoretical and 
empirical – literature has not examined the potentially different effects on the different tax rates.  
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Motivated by the above, in this paper we examine the importance of political 
ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. We use the standard 
measures of political ideology as in the aforementioned literature. In particular, we use 
measures of cabinet orientation developed and used by Castles and Mair (1984), Cusack 
(1997), Tavares (2004), and Budge et al. (1993) as updated by Woldendorp et al. (1998) 
that are based on expert surveys and locate parties on an ideological left-right scale. We 
capture electoral effects as in the literature, by constructing pre-electoral dummies. In 
order to approximate the tax rates on labor income, capital income and consumption, we 
use the ECFIN effective tax rates reported in Martinez-Mongay (2000). These are based 
on the Mendoza et al. (1994) approach, which basically consists of defining the tax rate 
as a ratio between the tax revenues from a particular tax base and the corresponding tax 
base. This is important, because the government is able to affect that tax rates by 
determining - through tax legislation – both the statutory tax rate and the tax base 
differentially for each source to be taxed. These effective tax rates have not been used so 
far in the relevant literature. Our dataset consists of a panel of 21 OECD countries over 
the period 1970-2000. We use the annual data but we also look at 5-year averages, as 
institutional and political barriers may make it difficult for policy makers to immediately 
implement their policy preferences. 
Our main finding is that there exists evidence for effects of both political ideology 
and pre-electoral opportunism on the income tax rates for the OECD economies. In 
particular, left-wing governments tax capital more relative to labor income. In addition, 
governments reduce the income tax rates before elections. These findings are generally 
robust to the measures of political ideology used, to the measures of effective tax rates 
used and to the use of annual or 5-year averaged data. Importantly, these findings are 
consistent with a large body of theoretical research in political economy, as discussed 
above. However, these theoretical predictions had not so far received empirical support, 
as the data on effective average tax rates that we use here had not been exploited in the 
past by the relevant empirical literature. 
 Using effective tax rates to capture the tax burden on the factors of production and 
consumption also reveals some further interesting political effects. Firstly, it seems that 
the role of the income of the self employed is important in examining the effects of 
ideology on the tax rates. In particular, it is the taxation of the income of employed labor 
that the left-wing governments mainly try to reduce relative to the taxation of the income 
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from capital and self employment. This finding is expected, as long as left-wing parties 
view income from self employment as income from entrepreneurial activity and not labor 
income. Secondly, we find that the partisan effects are easier to uncover when looking at 
the “gross” capital tax rates, although this finding is less robust. Such a result suggests 
that left-wing governments increase the tax burden on capital by essentially broadening 
the capital tax base, by being less willing to provide tax exemptions for depreciated 
capital. Both findings discussed above underlie the usefulness of using effective tax rates, 
as they can capture political effects on both the statutory tax rates and the tax base and 
carefully distinguish between different tax bases.  
Thirdly, it seems that it is in the capital income (especially when it includes the 
income of the self employed) that the reduction in taxation is bigger in pre-electoral 
periods. This is not straightforward to explain, based at least on the current theoretical 
literature, but it might indicate an increase in lobbying activities in the form of increased 
tax avoidance/evasion from the firms in pre-electoral periods, as labor (wage) income 
provides fewer opportunities for tax evasion. Fourthly, we find that although income tax 
rates are reduced in pre-electoral periods, consumption taxes are not, possibly indicating 
that the political cost of the latter is smaller. Finally, we uncover an empirical regularity 
that appears puzzling, at least when viewed in the context of the current theoretical 
research. In particular, left-wing governments are associated with increases in the 
consumption taxes. Explanations to this finding can potentially be obtained by looking at 
the relationship between political ideology and the government budget as a whole, which 
is an issue we do not examine in this paper.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
empirical methodology. Section 3 investigates the link between ideological motives and 
tax structure. Section 4 investigates the link between electoral motives and tax structure. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and empirical methodology      
 
2.1 Tax rates  
An important issue in our empirical study of the determinants of the tax structure (and 
one that distinguishes this work from existing studies in the relevant literature) is how to 
approximate the tax rates. The simple measures of statutory tax rates cannot capture the 
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complexity of the tax system nor provide a clear indicator of the implied tax policy. Since 
the overall tax burden does not depend solely on the statutory tax rates, but also on what 
is defined - by the tax legislation - as the tax base, we are in need of some more 
complicated tax measures that take into account changes in the tax base (e.g. changes in 
allowances or deductions). The approach of calculating effective average tax ratios, based 
on the Mendoza et al. (1994) approach, basically consists of defining the tax rate as a 
ratio of the tax revenues from a particular tax base to the corresponding tax base (for a 
critical comparison of alternative effective tax rate methodologies, see e.g. Volkerink and 
de Haan, 2001b). Hence, the main advantage of the average effective tax ratios is exactly 
that they carefully define the tax base from which the tax revenue is extracted and hence 
provide a more accurate description of the tax burden that falls on each factor input. Tax 
revenue as a share of GDP fails to capture the potentially different burdens across factors 
of production, or indeed, consumption, as again it does not use the correct tax base. 
Therefore, effective tax rates are a better proxy for policy changes on the tax structure, 
because the government is able to affect that tax rates by determining - through tax 
legislation – both the statutory tax rate and the tax base differentially for each source to 
be taxed. 
Previous empirical studies that examined the effect of partisan ideology and/or 
electoral opportunism on tax policies have employed tax revenue as a share of GDP as 
dependent variable (see e.g. Alesina et al., 1997, Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; 
Kneebone and McKenzie 2001) or statutory tax rates (e.g. Allers et al., 2001). However, 
as discussed above, tax revenue data and statutory tax rates are not adequate proxies of 
the tax burden as compared to more sophisticated measures like effective average tax 
rates. As far as we know, effective tax rates have not been used so far in empirical 
analysis of political effects of tax policy. An exception is Reed (2006), who looks at tax 
revenue over personal income in U.S. states, but does not break down this implicit tax 
rate in capital, labor income and consumption tax rates. Therefore, previous studies have 
not examined the effect of ideology on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of 
production and consumption, which is defined here as the tax structure. Ashworth and 
Heyndels (2002) have examined the effect of political incentives on the tax structure, but 
they approximate the latter by a tax structure turbulence indicator.3 Hence, in this paper, 
                                                 
3 The index for tax structure turbulence measures the extent to which a country tax structure in a year 
differs from the tax structure in the previous year. In order to calculate this tax structure turbulence 
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we make use of the advantages of the effective average tax rates to examine the effects of 
political incentives on the tax structure. 
In particular, we use the ECFIN effective tax rates reported in Martinez-Mongay 
(2000) (see the Appendix for more details on these data), which are available for 21 
OECD countries for the 1970-2000 period.4 We use the effective tax rates on labor 
(denoted as litr and letr), the effective tax rates on capital (kitn, kitg, ketn and ketg) and 
the effective tax rate on consumption (citr and cetr). The difference between the 
classification in litr and kitn or kitg compared to letr and ketn or ketg is that in the latter 
case, the income of self employed in treated as labor income, whereas in the former case 
the labor income includes only the income of employed labor. The difference between 
kitn and ketn, compared to kitg and ketg is that in the latter case capital depreciation is 
included in the tax base. We shall use the above tax rates to examine whether they are 
influenced by political variables, but we shall also consider the ratios of labor to capital 
tax rates in order to gauge the potential political effects on the relative income tax burden. 
In particular, we construct the variables ratio1, ratio2, ratio3 and ratio4, obtained as 
lirt/kitn, lirt/kitg, lert/ketn  and lert/ketg  respectively. 
 
2.2 Political data 
The measurement of differences in policy positions of parties has attracted extensive 
attention in the literature (see e.g. Budge, 2001). In the present study we rely on four 
alternative party family categorization measures that have been widely employed in order 
to analyze the impact of partisan politics on public policy and finance (see e.g. Tavares, 
2004, Volkerink and de Haan, 2001a and Mierau et al., 2007). All of these measures are 
based on expert surveys that locate parties on an ideological left-right scale (see e.g. 
Castles and Mair, 1984, Budge et al., 1993 and Woldendorp et al., 1998). 
More precisely, we employ: (i) the Budge et al. (1993) cabinet ideology index as 
updated by Woldendorp et al. (1998) (denoted as ideowold), (ii) the Tavares (2004) 
cabinet ideology measure (denoted as ideotav), (iii) the Castles and Mair (1984) cabinet 
ideology measure (ideocm) and (iv) the cabinet ideology measure developed by Cusack 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicator Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) employ data of tax revenues as a share of GDP which are grouped  
to six main categories (i.e. taxes on income, profits and capital gains, social security contributions, taxes on 
payroll and workforce, taxes on goods and services, taxes on property and other taxes).  
4 The countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, USA. 
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(1997) (ideocus).5 Both Woldendorp et al. (1998) and Tavares (2004) cabinet ideology 
indices locate cabinet ideology on a 1 to 5 political spectrum with higher values denoting 
more extreme left-wing governments. On the other hand, Cusack (1997) and Castles and 
Mair (1984) measures locate government ideology on a min-max range with higher 
values denoting more extreme right-wing government.6  
Finally, opportunistic effects are captured by a dummy variable (denoted as 
elections) which equals one in years in which a national election was held and zero in 
non-elections years. Data for elections are obtained by Cusack (1997).  
 
2.3 Empirical methodology 
We wish to estimate the effects of political ideology and opportunism on the tax 
structure, in a panel of 21 OECD countries observed over 1970-2000. In order to examine 
the effects of ideology on the tax structure, we mainly focus on 5-year periods and 
calculate data averages for the six 5-year periods between 1970 and 2000.7 The reason for 
preferring 5-year periods to annual data to analyze the effects of ideology on policy 
decisions is that institutional and political barriers may make it difficult for policy makers 
to immediately implement their policy preferences. In working with 5-year averages we 
follow the relevant literature (see e.g. Reed, 2006). However, as a robustness check, we 
also use the annual data as such. In order to examine electoral effects on tax-policy 
choices, we focus on the annual data, as this is in accordance with the natural timing of 
elections and also the usual approach in the related literature (see e.g. Kneebone and 
McKenzie, 2001). 
 We define the tax structure as the distribution of the tax burden across factors of 
production and consumption. In order to examine the effect of political factors in the 
choice of the tax structure, we look at the effect of political ideology and pre-election 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that these alternative cabinet ideology measures are based on two broad party family 
classifications. The first one is that developed by Budge et al. (1993) and followed by Woldendorp et al 
(1998) and Tavares (2004) whereas the second is that of Castles and Mair (1984) also followed by Cusack 
(1997). Thus, we expect ideowold to be more related to ideotav and ideocm to ideocus. 
6 Castles and Mair (1984) generate their ideological scores from a questionnaire survey of more than 115 
political scientists in Western Europe and United States. Each expert was asked to place parties holding 
seats in the national legislature on a left-wing political spectrum ranging from 0 (extreme left-wing) to 10 
(extreme right-wing, with 2.5, 5 and 7.5 representing moderate left, the center and moderate right, 
respectively. Cusack (1997) developed his measure of cabinet ideology based on the Castles and Mair 
ideological scores. Ideocus is coded on a 1 to 5 scale with higher values denoting more extreme right-wing 
governments.  
7 The averages are calculated for the 5-year periods 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-
1995 and 1996-2000.  
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motives at the levels of the labor, capital and consumption tax rates, using the political 
and tax data described above. Focusing on the allocation of the tax burden between the 
labor and capital production inputs, which has attracted most of the interest in the 
theoretical literature, we also examine the effect of the political variables on the ratio of 
labor to capital tax rates. The advantage of this approach is that it looks at the relative 
burden. For instance, left-wing governments might prefer to increase both tax rates on 
capital and labor, relative to right-wing governments, so that by looking at the ideology 
effects on levels might not easily reveal a preference for left-wing governments to 
increase the tax burden on capital relative to labor. However, looking at the ratio of the 
tax rates, we could capture such ideology effects on the tax structure.    
The equations we estimate are of the form: 
 
ititititit uXpoltaxtax ++++= − βααα 2110                                                                        (1) 
 
where ittax  is the measure of tax rate or of the ratio of labor to capital tax rates of country 
i  at time period t  ( t  being the 5-year period or the year), itpol  is a measure of political 
ideology or pre-electoral motives, and itX  includes control variables usually included in 
regressions for fiscal policy measures (see below). Note that the regression includes the 
lagged value of the ittax  measure, to account for persistence in tax policies. We also 
allow for country and time specific effects (denoted respectively as ic and tv ), so that the 
error term is written as: 
 
ittiit vcu ε++=                                                                                                                 (2) 
 
where itε  is assumed to be i.i.d. In what follows, we control for country effects by either 
fixed effects estimation or by first differencing. We also control for time effects by 
including dummies for each time period in our regressions. 
Our interest here lies in estimating 2α , the effect of political variables. We assume 
throughout this analysis, following the literature, that measures of political ideology and 
opportunism are exogenous in estimating models of the form of (1) – (2). However, 
dynamic panel data models as the above do not satisfy the strict exogeneity assumption, 
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because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. In addition, 
certain variables in itX  may only be predetermined or even endogenous in (1) – (2) (see 
e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, ch. 11, on panel data models without the strict exogeneity 
assumption). Ignoring the above, generally results in biases in the estimated coefficients.  
It can be shown (see e.g. the references above) that the size of the inconsistency 
introduced by the fixed effects estimator when strict exogeneity is not satisfied decreases 
by the time dimension of the panel. Therefore, as fiscal and political data are in general 
available for many years for many countries, the literature (see the papers referred to 
above) has used this result to estimate equations like (1) – (2) by fixed effects. Here, 
when we use the annual data, the same arguments apply, as we have data for 26-29 time 
periods, depending on the political variables and tax measures we use. Therefore, for the 
annual dataset we present results from fixed effects estimation (this has the additional 
advantage of making our results more easily comparable to those of the relevant 
literature). However, for the dataset in 5-year averages, we have data for 4 time periods 
only, when we take into account the requirements of lagging the data and taking first 
differences. Hence, for this dataset, we explicitly allow for predetermined variables in (1) 
– (2) and present results by using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator.8   
Regarding the variables included in itX  we follow the literature on the 
determinants of national tax structure (see e.g. Devereux et al. 2007, 2008; Winner, 
2005).9 The literature is generally looking at determinants of the overall size of the 
government or of proxies for the level of the tax rates. In this study, we run regressions 
for the level of the tax rates, but we also look at the ratio of labor to capital tax rates. This 
has not been examined in the literature. Hence, for these regressions, existing research 
does not help to create a clear expectation for the effect of the variables in itX  on the 
dependent variable. 
We first include in itX  the GDP per capita (denoted as gdppc). This is obtained 
from the World Bank Development Indicators (2004) (hereafter WDI (2004)) and for the 
5-year period dataset it is the value of the year before the 5-period (i.e. for the period 
1981-1985 it is the value of 1980), while it is the value of the previous year for the annual 
                                                 
8 We also report that estimating the equations for the 5-year dataset with fixed effects and the equations for 
the annual dataset with GMM as in Arellano and Bond (1991), does not change the main qualitative results 
discussed below, regarding the coefficients of the key variables of interest - the political measures. 
9 More details on the data used are in the Data Appendix. 
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dataset. According to Wagner’ law, we would expect gdppc to be positively related with 
measures of the overall size of the government, but there is no ex ante theoretical reason 
for a positive or negative relationship with the ratios of the tax rates. As a country gets 
richer, it may need to rely more or less on labor versus capital taxation or on direct versus 
indirect taxation. An additional economic variable that can be related with the tax 
structure is the level of government spending. Government spending is expected to be 
positively related with taxation, but again higher government spending may require more 
or less labor versus capital taxation or direct versus indirect taxation. To control for the 
effects of government spending on the tax structure, we present results using government 
expenditure as a share of GDP, available from WDI, denoted as govexp and averaged 
over the 5-year periods for the dataset in 5-year averages.10 
We also include some standard demographic variables: the proportion of the 
economically dependent population (denoted as agedep), the total population 
(population) and the urbanization rate (denoted as urban) (i.e. the proportion of 
population living in urban areas). Data for these variables are obtained from WDI (2004). 
Agedep is expected to be positively related with taxation since higher proportion of 
economically dependent population generate fiscal needs which in turn increase tax rates. 
However, there is no clear theoretical reason for a positive or negative relation with the 
ratios of labor to capital tax rates. On the other hand, population and urban are expected 
to be negatively related with taxation. This is because these measures capture potential 
economies of scale in the provision of public goods (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). Larger 
economies of scale induce lower per capita cost of public goods and consequently lower 
levels of taxation. Again, there is no ex ante theoretical reason for a positive or negative 
relationship with measures of the tax structure. Finally, we employ the capital market 
international integration measure constructed by Quinn (1997) (denoted as capopenness). 
Capopenness is coded on a 0 to 100 scale with higher values denoting weaker 
international capital mobility restrictions and thus more integrated capital market. 
According to the tax competition theory (see e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991) 
capopenness is expected to be positively related with labor tax rates and negatively with 
                                                 
10 This is the total expenditure of the central government (see the Data Appendix for more details). We 
report that the basic results do not change if we use total expenditures of the general government, available 
from GFS. In fact, the z-statistics and t-statistics for the political variables of interest in Tables 1 and 4 get 
higher and the z-statistics and t-statistics for the capital tax rates in Tables 2 and 5 get also bigger. We 
present results using the WDI variable (govexp) because there are more observations available for this. 
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capital tax rates.11 We use the 5-year average of these variables for the dataset in 5-year 
averages. 
 
3. Ideology and the tax structure 
 
In this section we examine whether the data suggest a relationship between the ideology 
of the party in government and tax policy choices. We first present results using 5-year 
averages and then present results using the annual dataset.   
 
3.1 Results using 5-year averages for the tax ratios 
We first examine whether the ideological orientation of the government matters for the 
tax structure, as approximated by the ratio of labor to capital effective tax rates. We 
estimate (1) – (2), with the control variables discussed in section 2.3, by using the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, where the lagged dependent variable is 
instrumented by all the available lags. In addition, we allow in these regressions for non-
exogeneity of gdppc and govexp. In particular, gdppc may only be predetermined, as 
contemporaneous correlation with the error term can be ruled out (since we use the 
lagged value of per capita GDP), but strict exogeneity need not hold, because the error 
term can be correlated with future values of gdppc. Regarding govexp, we want to allow 
for potential endogeneity, as, for instance, governments may react to exogenous negative 
shocks by changing both government spending and the allocation of the tax burden. 
Hence, in the GMM regressions, we treat gdppc as predetermined and govexp as 
endogenous and use lagged values as instruments (we use a maximum of two lagged 
values as instruments).  
Results for the ratios of the labor to capital tax rates are presented in Table 1. 
When we take into account the requirements of lagging the data and taking first 
differences, the sample period for estimation is the four 5-year periods in 1980-2000. 
Time dummies are included for each period in all equations. Two specification tests are 
also reported. The 2m  statistic, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for second 
                                                 
11 According to the benchmark tax competition model (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) tax competition 
among different regions leads to suboptimally low capital tax rates and an inefficiently low level of public 
goods. Allowing for a second tax instrument (i.e. a labor tax), the local governments find it optimal to rely 
more on labor taxation to finance the public good (Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991).  
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order serial correlation in the residuals of the first-differenced equations, and the Sargan 
test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, to test for the validity of the instruments.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 presents the results for the effects of the four measures of political 
ideology on the four labor-to-capital tax ratios. In all cases, the coefficients of the 
political variables indicate similar qualitative results. Namely, left-wing governments 
tend to rely more on capital taxation relative to labor taxation. More precisely, the 
coefficient of ideowold bears a negative sign and is statistically significant, at least for the 
three first ratios (for the fourth ratio it is marginally insignificant at 10% level). Similar 
results, regarding the sign, are obtained also for the coefficient of ideotav, which appears 
to be statistically significant for the first and the third ratio. The coefficient on ideocm 
bears a positive sign and is statistically significant for all four ratios, whereas the 
coefficient on ideocus is positive and is statistically significant for the first two ratios. 
Note that the implications of ideocm and ideocus are similar to the ones of the previous 
measures (ideowold and ideotav), since the positive sign of these coefficients is simply 
due to the opposite way that ideocm and ideocus classify left-wing and right wing 
cabinets relative to ideowold and ideotav (see Section 2.2 for details).  
Our first result is therefore that left-wing governments increase the taxation of 
capital, relative to that on labor. It is interesting to note that this result is more robust 
when we look at ratio1 and ratio2. In addition, note that the estimated coefficients are 
generally bigger for the regressions for ratio1 and ratio2 compared to those for ratio3 
and ratio4. Recall that in the first two ratios the numerator is litr. As explained above, the 
difference between litr and letr (the numerator in ratio3 and ratio4) is that the income of 
the self-employed is not treated as labor income in litr. Hence, the data suggest that left-
wing political ideology is likely to decrease the tax burden on the income of employed 
labor relative to income from capital and self employment.  
Regarding the explanatory variables, the coefficients of govexp and agedep are 
positive when they are statistically significant, whereas capopenness and urban enter 
with negative and statistically significant coefficients in some cases. Moreover, we 
observe that gdppc and population are insignificant in all the estimations. As we have 
already pointed out, there are not clear theoretical predictions regarding the estimates for 
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the control variables in the regressions where the dependent variables are ratios of labor 
to capital tax rates.12 In any case, the results seem to suggest that when governments are 
faced with budgetary pressures, in the form of increased expenditure or adverse 
demographic evolutions, they tend to increase labor taxes more than capital taxes. In 
addition, the negative sign obtained for the coefficient of urban could indicate that in 
more urbanized societies, workers have more lobbying power on governmental decisions. 
However, this interpretation is not robust as we shall see below. Finally, we observe that 
the estimated coefficients of the lagged ratios change sign across regressions with 
different dependent variables, but also across regressions with different political 
determinants, for the same dependent variable. Hence, although there seems to be 
persistence in the choice of the tax system, there is no robust pattern across different tax 
ratios. 
Concerning the specification tests, there are two cases in Table 1, for the 
regressions using the ideocm measure for ratio2 and ratio4, where the specification tests 
reject the nulls, but the overall picture is good with – generally – high p-values.  
 
3.2 Results using 5-year averages for the level of tax rates 
Table 1 shows that left-wing governments prefer a lower ratio of labor to capital taxation 
than right wing governments. But is this realized by decreases in the labor tax rate or 
increases in the capital tax rate? A lower labor to capital ratio can also be obtained if the 
government increases both taxes, but increase capital taxation by more relative to labor; 
or, if the government decreases both taxes, but decreases capital taxation by less relative 
to labor. We now try to answer this question. 
 
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
 In Tables 2 and 3 we present results from regressions where the levels of the 
effective average tax rates are regressed on the political measures and the control 
variables described before, using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, as for 
                                                 
12 An exception is capopenness. As we have already noted, according to the tax competition theory this 
capital market integration measure would be expected to be positively related with the ratio of labor to 
capital tax rates. However, our empirical findings suggest a negative relationship between capopenness and 
most of the labor to capital tax ratios. This puzzling result, which is mainly driven by the positive effect of 
capopenness on the levels of capital tax rates (see Table 2), will be discussed below with the results of 
Table 2. 
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the regressions in Table 1. In Table 2, we present the results for the regressions where 
ideowold is the political variable, whereas in Table 3, to save on space, we only report the 
estimated coefficients of political variables obtained from similar regressions where these 
variables are used as a measure of ideology.  
Three basic results emerge. Firstly, there seems to be no effect of ideology on the 
labor tax rates, as all four alternative ideology proxies are not significant in the 
regressions where litr and letr are the dependent variables. Although this could indeed 
indicate that there are no ideology effects on the level of the labor income tax rates, we 
need to be careful as partisan motives may work in labor income taxation through the 
progressivity of the tax system, which the effective average tax rates fail to capture.  
Secondly, more left-wing governments tend to increase the tax burden on capital. 
This result is clear in the cases of the “gross” rates (i.e. where kitg and ketg are the 
dependent variables) but also holds in some of the estimations where ketn and kitn are the 
dependent variables. The finding that partisan effects are easier to uncover when looking 
at the “gross” capital tax rates is interesting as it highlights the advantages of looking at 
the effects of ideology on both the statutory tax rates and the tax base, as indeed captured 
by the effective tax rates. In particular, the above results suggest that left-wing 
governments increase the tax burden on capital by essentially broadening the capital tax 
base. The latter takes place as left-wing governments are less willing to provide tax 
exemptions for depreciated capital.  
Finally, there is clear evidence that left-wing governments tend to also increase 
consumption taxes. In most the regressions where citr and cetr are the dependent 
variables, political ideology measures bear statistically significant coefficients. This is an 
interesting and somewhat puzzling finding, as one might expect that right-wing 
governments would prefer to tax consumption more than left-wing governments, given 
that consumption taxation is regressive with respect to income. One potential explanation 
for our finding here is that left-wing parties are likelier to prefer a larger government, but 
note that government expenditure has a negative sign in these regressions, once ideology 
is controlled for. Another potential explanation would be that left-wing governments 
might prefer to use the consumption tax income to decrease accumulated debt, whereas 
right-wing governments might be more willing to live with larger debts (see e.g. Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) and Lockwood et al. (1996) for the role of ideology on public debt 
accumulation). A careful examination of political ideology on the dynamics of the 
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government budget could provide useful empirical findings regarding the robustness and 
explanation of this relationship, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.      
Regarding the control variables, gdppc is insignificant in most regressions, while 
govexp is positive and statistically significant in the regressions where litr and letr are the 
dependent variables but is negative in most of the remaining regressions, indicating that 
increases in fiscal spending are financed primarily by increases in labor income 
taxation.13 Population and agedep are not significant, whereas capopenness enters with 
positive sign in most of the regressions where capital tax rates are the dependent variable. 
The puzzling positive relationship between capopenness and capital tax rates could be 
attributed to the “tax cut cum base broadening” strategy followed by most of the OECD 
economies as a response to international market integration.14 In any case, this result is 
not robust to using the annual data, as we shall see below.  
We also present, in Table 2, the specification tests we presented in Table 1; they 
are all supportive of the model specification. We report that similar results are generally 
obtained for the regressions in Table 3.15 
 
3.3 Results using the annual dataset 
In this sub-section, we examine the robustness of the previous results when we use the 
annual data. Therefore, we re-estimate the equations in (1)-(2), using the annual data 
from 1970 to 2000. In order to account for country-specific and time-specific 
unobservable factors we estimate the regressions by fixed effects allowing for time 
                                                 
13 We note that these results are not robust (see Table 5 and Table7) and thus we do not proceed further 
with this. The same (non-robustness) applies to the estimated positive effect of urban in the regressions 
with the labor tax rates. 
14 Although in most OECD countries statutory tax rates on capital have fallen sharply over the past few 
decades, the tax bases have been broadened through reduced allowances and deductions. Tax reforms have 
followed the so-called “tax cut cum base broadening” strategy, leaving the effective tax rate on capital 
fairly stable or even increasing. This “tax cut cum base broadening” strategy can be best explained by 
focusing on the operation of multinational enterprises (MNE), and especially on the practice of profit 
shifting among the subsidiary and its parent. This practice –followed by MNE-of transferring part of 
taxable profits in countries with low statutory tax rates has led national governments to compete for (paper) 
profits by lowering their statutory tax rates. This downward trend of statutory tax rates has been 
accompanied by a corresponding broadening of the tax base (though reduced allowances and deductions), 
which left the corporate effective tax rates fairly stable or even increasing. For two very good surveys on 
corporate income tax reforms in OECD countries see Devereux et al. (2002) and Griffith and Klemm 
(2004). 
15 The p-values for the serial correlation and the Sargan tests are in general high for all the regressions in 
Table 3, with the exception of the Sargan statistic for the ideocus regression for letr, where the p-value is 
approximately 10%, and the serial correlation statistic for the ideocm regression for letr, where the p-value 
is at 9%.  
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dummies in all equations. Results for the ratios of the labor to capital tax rates are 
presented in Table 4, while results for the levels of the tax rates are in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the effects of the four measures of political 
ideology on the four labor to capital tax ratios. As can be seen, our empirical findings 
remain qualitative intact although deteriorate in terms of statistical significance, mainly 
for ratio3 and ratio4, which is again consistent with our previous speculation that left-
wing governments target primarily the income of employed labor. Note also that the 
estimated coefficients are twice as big or bigger for the regressions for ratio1 and ratio2 
compared to those for ratio3 and ratio4.  
Generally, as before, the coefficients of all four alternative political variables 
indicate that left-wing governments tend to rely more on capital relative to labor taxation. 
More precisely, the coefficient of ideowold bears a negative and statistically significant 
for ratio1 and ratio2 whereas appears to be marginally insignificant for ratio3. Similar 
results, regarding the sign, are obtained also for the coefficient of ideotav which appears 
to be statistically significant for the first three ratios. Ideocm enters with a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient in the cases of ratio2 and ratio4, whereas the 
coefficient on ideocus is positive and is statistically significant for the first two ratios.  
Concerning the explanatory variables, our results are qualitative similar to those 
presented in Table 1 regarding the coefficients of capopenness and urban. In particular, 
they remain negative, although capopenness is not significant in most regressions. The 
coefficients of govexp and agedep are not significant. It is worth noting that, as expected, 
there is much more persistence in the annual tax rates, as is verified by the high 
coefficients and t-ratios for the lagged dependent variables in Table 4. 
 
[Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 
In Tables 5 and 6 we present results from regressions where the levels of the effective 
average tax rates are regressed on the political measures and the control variables 
described before, using the two-way error component fixed effect estimator and the 
annual dataset, as for the regressions in Table 4. More precisely, in Table 5, we present 
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the results for the regressions where ideowold is the political variable, whereas in Table 
6, to save on space, we report the estimated coefficient of all four political variables 
obtained from similar regressions. 
Generally, the results are consistent with those presented in the previous section. 
In particular, none of the coefficients of the political variables measures appears to be 
significant in regressions where litr or letr are the dependent variables. This implies that 
there seems to be no effect of ideology on the effective average labor tax rates. On the 
other hand, in most of the estimations where capital tax rates are the dependent variables, 
the political ideology proxies suggest that left-wing governments tend to increase the tax 
burden on capital. Nevertheless, the t-ratios for the political ideology coefficients are 
generally lower compared to Table 3, which explains the lower t-ratios for the political 
ideology coefficients in Table 4. Finally there is again clear evidence that left-wing 
governments tend also to rely on indirect taxation. In all the estimations where citr and 
cetr are the dependent variables, the political ideology measures enter with highly 
significant coefficients.  
Regarding the control variables our results remain qualitative similar. Gdppc, and 
govexp are positive in those regressions where they are statistically significant, whereas 
capopenness, population and agedep are not insignificant. Urban is now significant in the 
regressions for the capital tax rates, which is consistent with its negative sign in Tables 1 
and 4.  Finally, the lagged level of the tax rates is always highly significant.   
 
4. Electoral cycles and the tax structure 
 
In this section we examine whether the data indicate electoral effects on tax policy 
choices.  The literature has documented a negative effect of pre-electoral periods on 
taxation (see e.g. Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001) which is consistent with the 
implications of the theoretical literature of political business cycles, i.e. that incumbent 
policy makers try to decrease that tax burden before elections in an effort to increase their 
probability for re-election (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1975, Linbeck, 1976 and Rogoff, 1990).  It 
is useful, however, to examine whether labor or capital taxes decrease more in pre-
electoral periods.  
We present results using the annual dataset and, following the literature, we use a 
dummy for pre-election periods to capture electoral motives. We use the same set of 
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control variables described above. Again, given the long time series dimension of the 
panel, we estimate our equations by fixed effects. Results are reported in Table 7. For 
each dependent variable in this Table, we run two regressions, one that includes a 
political ideology variable (ideowold) in addition to the electoral dummy, and one where 
the only political variable is the electoral dummy.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
We first look at the levels of the effective tax rates, where the presence of 
opportunistic effects on tax policy is strikingly apparent.  The coefficient of the election 
dummy is negative and highly significant in the regressions where litr and letr are the 
dependent variable indicating that governments tend to reduce the tax burden on labor in 
pre-electoral periods. Similar effects are verified also in most of the cases where capital 
tax rates are employed as dependents. In particular, election enters with a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient in the regressions where kitn, kitg and ketg are 
dependent variables highlighting the negative effect of electoral uncertainty on the tax 
burden on capital. However, the presence of opportunistic effects is not clear in the 
regressions where consumption taxes are employed as dependent variables. In particular, 
the estimated coefficients for elections are in this case only marginally significant and 
very sensitive to the inclusion of the political ideology proxy. 
The above results suggest that the governments tend to decrease the income tax 
rates before elections, but not necessarily the consumption tax rates. This implies that the 
income tax rates (are perceived to) have a bigger impact on voters’ choices compared to 
consumption taxes. Although such an explanation seems intuitive, we are not aware  of 
theoretical research that would support such a prediction.  
To further investigate the effects of electoral opportunism on the income tax rates, 
we examine whether there is evidence to suggest that governments reduce labor or capital 
tax rates by more before elections. As can be seen in Table 7, elections enter with a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient in the estimations where ratio1 and ratio2 
are the dependent variables once we control for partisan effects. This result suggests that 
although in pre-electoral periods both the tax burdens on labor and capital are reduced, 
the ratio of the tax rates on capital fall by more, at least when we control for ideology 
effects on the relative tax rates (this is also confirmed when we look at the coefficients of 
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elections in the regressions for kitn and kitg versus litr). Recall also that the numerator in 
ratio1 and ratio2 is the tax rate on employed labor. This implies that the reduction in the 
labor to capital taxes in pre-electoral periods is clearer when we include the income of the 
self-employed in the capital taxes. Therefore, it seems that in pre-electoral periods not 
only the capital tax rates but (primarily) the tax revenue collected from the self employed 
is reduced. Given that capital income and the income from self employment is the most 
difficult to tax, our findings here are consistent with increased tax avoidance/evasion in 
pre-electoral periods (see also Angelopoulos and Economides, 2008, for a theoretical 
model and empirical evidence that rent seeking activities related to the government 
budget increase in pre-electoral periods). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We examined the effects of political ideology and pre-electoral opportunism on the tax 
rates and found that there is evidence of both for the OECD economies. In particular, our 
main finding regarding the income tax rates is that left-wing governments tax capital 
more relative to labor income and that governments reduce the income tax rates before 
elections. Although these findings are consistent with the theoretical research in political 
economy, they had not so far received empirical support, as the data on effective average 
tax rates that we use here had not been exploited in the past by the relevant empirical 
literature. 
 Moreover, using effective tax rates to capture the tax burden on the factors of 
production and consumption has also revealed some further interesting political effects. 
Firstly, it is the taxation of the income of employed labor that the left-wing governments 
mainly try to reduce relative to the taxation of the income from capital and self 
employment. Secondly, the results suggest that left-wing governments increase the tax 
burden on capital by essentially broadening the capital tax base, by being les willing to 
provide tax exemptions for depreciated capital. Both findings discussed above underlie 
the usefulness of using effective tax rates, as they can capture political effects on both the 
statutory tax rates and the tax base and carefully distinguish between different tax bases. 
Thirdly, it seems that it is in the capital income (especially when it includes the income of 
the self employed) that the reduction in taxation is bigger in pre-electoral periods. 
Fourthly, we found that although income tax rates are reduced in pre-electoral periods, 
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consumption taxes are not, possibly indicating that the political cost of the latter is 
smaller. Finally, left-wing governments are associated with increases in the consumption 
taxes. 
 A limitation of working with effective average tax rates is that we cannot capture 
ideology effects on the progressivity of the tax system. Provided that adequate measures 
of tax progressivity can be constructed, it would be interesting to examine whether such 
effects exist. In addition, it would be a useful addition to the empirical literature on the 
political determinants of fiscal policy to examine the effects of ideology and opportunism 
on the composition of government spending and the government budget more generally. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: ECFIN effective tax rates in more detail 
The ECFIN effective tax rates on labor (denoted as litr and letr), on consumption (citr 
and cetr) and on capital (kitn, kitg, ketn and ketg) used in this paper are all taken from 
Martinez-Mongay (2000). Martinez-Mongay calls litr, citr, kitn and kitg as “implicit” tax 
rates and letr, cetr, ketn and ketg as “effective” tax rates.16 All these alternative tax rates 
are based on the same principle of “effective taxation”. The methodology of effective tax 
rates, following Mendoza et al. (1994), basically consists of defining the tax rate as a 
ratio between the tax revenues from particular taxes and the corresponding tax base (for a 
critical comparison of different methodologies, see Volkerink and de Haan, 2001b). 
Concerning the effective tax rate on labor, Martinez-Mongay provides two 
different tax indicators: letr can be viewed as a more general measure of tax on labor 
income while litr better proxies the tax burden faced by the employed labor (thus 
excludes the taxation of the imputed wage of self-employed labor). Although differences 
between the two rates are minor in the case of more advanced economies, there are 
countries (e.g. Greece and Portugal) where the two rates differ significantly in terms of 
level. This is because in these countries the share of self-employed labor to the total 
employment is larger. However, despite divergences in level, the evolution of litr and letr 
over time seem to be common (correlation coefficients between the five-year average 
levels of litr and letr range from 91% in the nineties to 97% in the late seventies).  
Following the general concept of effective tax rates, the effective tax rate on 
consumption should be the ratio of tax revenues from consumption taxes to the pre-tax 
value of consumption. Thus the effective tax rate on consumption is the difference 
between the consumer price (post tax price) and the producer price (pre tax price) 
expressed as a percentage of producer price (cetr) or the consumer price (citr). It is clear 
form the above that citr and cetr are equivalent in terms of evolution over time or 
between countries, although citr is always smaller in terms of level (in the case of the 
euro area and EU-15 the difference is of 5 to 6 percentage points). Both correlation 
coefficients between the five years average levels of citr and cetr are equal to one (see 
Martinez-Mongay, pp.37-38) 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that the letr, citr, and ketg variables are closer to the standard Mendoza et al. (1994) 
methodology of effective tax rates. 
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Finally, concerning the taxation of capital income, Martinez-Mongay provides 
four alternative tax indicators. The inclusion or the exclusion of the imputed wage 
income of self-employed labor on the capital tax base is a first issue concerning the 
definition of capital tax base. A second issue is whether the capital income should include 
or exclude depreciation. ketg and ketn are based on the assumption that wage of self-
employed income is not concerned as capital income where the former includes 
depreciation in the tax base and the latter does not. On the other hand, kitg and kitn are 
based on the assumption that the whole income of self-employed labor is concerned as 
capital income where the former views depreciation as part of capital tax base and the 
latter does not. As expected, some differences exist between alternative indicators for the 
tax burden of capital income. However, such differences are not always large. For 
instance, it seems that the inclusion (kitg, ketg) or the exclusion (kitn, ketn) of 
depreciation from the tax base does not induce significant changes in the conclusions 
regarding the relative burden across countries and the ordering (correlation coefficients 
between the five-year average levels of kitg and kitn range from 90% in the nineties to the 
99% in the late seventies while ketg and ketn also seem to be highly correlated). 
 
Appendix B: Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min max Source 
ratio1 
Ratio of effective tax 
rate on  labor to 
effective tax rate on 
capital (=lirt/kitn) 
496 1.242 0.666 0.47 4.08 
Own calculations 
based on Martinez-
Mongay (2000) 
ratio2 
Ratio of effective tax 
rate on  labor to 
effective tax rate on 
capital (=litr/kitg) 
496 1.839 0.744 0.70 4.79 
Own calculations 
based on Martinez-
Mongay (2000) 
ratio3 
Ratio of effective tax 
rate on  labor to 
effective tax rate on 
capital  (=letr/ketn) 
496 0.809 0.302 0.13 1.79 
Own calculations 
based on Martinez-
Mongay (2000) 
ratio4 
Ratio of effective tax 
rate on  labor to 
effective tax rate on 
capital (=letr/ketg) 
496 1.647 0.599 0.36 4.08 
Own calculations 
based on Martinez-
Mongay (2000) 
litr Labor effective tax rate 496 33.211 9.601 11.70 54.20 
Martinez-Mongay 
(2000) 
letr Effective tax rate of employed labor 496 30.527 10.173 9.80 54.10 
Martinez-Mongay 
(2000) 
kitn 
Capital implicit tax 
rate as a share of net 
operating surplus 
496 31.710 12.732 6.50 62.70 Martinez-Mongay (2000) 
kitg Capital implicit tax 496 19.834 6.232 5.30 31.70 Martinez-Mongay 
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rate as a share of gross 
operating surplus 
(2000) 
ketn 
Capital effective tax 
rate as a share of net 
operating surplus 
496 42.749 18.297 8.50 131.10 Martinez-Mongay (2000) 
ketg 
Capital effective tax 
rate as a share of gross 
operating surplus 
496 19.836 6.100 6.80 38.00 Martinez-Mongay (2000) 
citr Consumption “implicit” tax rate 496 19.188 5.141 9.10 31.40 
Martinez-Mongay 
(2000) 
cetr Consumption effective tax rate 496 24.243 7.968 10.00 45.7 
Martinez-Mongay 
(2000) 
elections Election Dummy 528 0.303 0.460 0.00 1.00 Cusack (1997)  
ideowold Cabinet Ideological Index 515 2.458 1.604 1.00 5.00 
Woldendorp et al. 
(1998) 
ideotav Cabinet Ideological Index 608 2.629 1.569 1.00 5.00 Tavares (2004) 
ideocm Cabinet Ideological Index 439 5.049 1.529 2.00 8.40 
Castles and Mair 
(1984) 
ideocus Cabinet Ideological Index 503 3.053 0.782 2.00 4.00 Cusack (1997) 
gdppc GDP per capita (constant 1995 US $) 650 22220.87 9239.791 4980.00 58464.00 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2004) 
govexp Total Government Spending (% GDP) 590 33.204 10.521 13.00 55.80 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2004) 
capopeness Capital Market Integration Index 597 77.449 19.551 37.50 100 Quinn (1997) 
population Total Population 651 3.67e+07 5.47e+07 340000 2.82e+08 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2004) 
agedep 
Proportion of 
economically 
dependent population 
(% Total Population) 
651 0.524 0.056 0.44 0.74 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2004) 
urban 
Proportion of 
Population living in 
urban areas (% Total 
Population) 
651 73.536 13.703 25.91 97.34 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2004) 
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Table 1: The effect of ideology on the tax structure: Ratios of tax rates, 5 year averages for 1970-2000 (GMM estimation) 
 
 
ratio1 ratio1 ratio1 ratio1 ratio2 ratio2 ratio2 ratio2 ratio3 ratio3 ratio3 ratio3 ratio4 ratio4 ratio4 ratio4 
ideowold -0.040 
(-2.51) 
   -0.051 
(-2.25) 
   -0.019 
(-1.78) 
   -0.040 
(-1.59) 
   
ideotav  -0.027 
(-1.73) 
   -0.036 
(-1.60) 
   -0.021 
(-1.94) 
   -0.028 
(-1.17) 
  
ideocm   0.047 
(3.63) 
   0.082 
(3.55) 
   0.022 
(2.03) 
   0.048 
(1.86) 
 
ideocus    0.080 
(3.18) 
   0.143 
(3.18) 
   0.037 
(1.39) 
   0.068 
(1.10) 
lag ratio -0.395 
(-1.99) 
-0.218 
(-1.01) 
0.563 
(4.70) 
-0.055 
(-0.24) 
-0.173 
(-0.83) 
-0.116 
(-0.56) 
0.545 
(3.99) 
-0.006 
(-0.03) 
0.033 
(0.22) 
0.060 
(0.41) 
0.192 
(1.27) 
0.257 
(1.29) 
-0.474 
(-2.27) 
-0.453 
(-2.20) 
-0.279 
(-1.39) 
-0.589 
(-2.52) 
gdppc -0.004 
(-0.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.021 
(1.00) 
-0.018 
(-1.31) 
0.027 
(1.20) 
0.023 
(1.03) 
0.041 
(1.10) 
0.011 
(0.48) 
0.013 
(1.23) 
0.011 
(1.15) 
0.014 
(0.87) 
0.012 
(1.10) 
0.041 
(1.64) 
0.387 
(1.55) 
0.033 
(0.77) 
0.034 
(1.32) 
govexp -0.011 
(-1.28) 
-0.005 
(-0.51) 
0.015 
(1.96) 
-0.022 
(-0.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.38) 
-0.027 
(-0.23) 
0.016 
(1.30) 
0.003 
(0.29) 
0.012 
(2.11) 
0.010 
(2.13) 
0.016 
(1.96) 
0.011 
(2.29) 
0.039 
(3.63) 
0.038 
(3.57) 
0.011 
(0.85) 
0.039 
(3.43) 
capopeness -0.004 
(-1.18) 
-0.005 
(-1.54) 
-0.005 
(-2.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
-0.006 
(-1.18) 
-0.006 
(-1..31) 
-0.012 
(-2.65) 
-0.004 
(-1.01) 
-0.005 
(-2.09) 
-0.005 
(-2.11) 
-0.003 
(-1.50) 
-0.003 
(-1.34) 
-0.010 
(-2.13) 
-0.011 
(-2.18) 
-0.010 
(-1.94) 
-0.010 
(-1.86) 
population -1.454 
(-0.35) 
-1.479 
(-0.35) 
-23.91 
(-0.86) 
1.843 
(0.51) 
-1.441 
(-0.24) 
-0.739 
(-0.12) 
-33.21 
(-0.65) 
2.617 
(0.47) 
-0.567 
(-0.19) 
-0.210 
(-0.07) 
-0.003 
(-1.50) 
0.450 
(0.15) 
1.209 
(0.18) 
1.980 
(0.29) 
35.003 
(0.59) 
2.309 
(0.33) 
agedep 2.995 
(2.71) 
2.283 
(2.01) 
0.336 
(0.42) 
1.427 
(1.30) 
3.238 
(1.95) 
2.779 
(1.65) 
0.687 
(0.47) 
1.652 
(0.98) 
-0.423 
(-0.70) 
-0.451 
(-0.76) 
-0.708 
(-1.34) 
-0.663 
(-1.06) 
-0.421 
(-9.31) 
-0.453 
(-0.33) 
2.026 
(1.58) 
-0.335 
(-0.23) 
urban -0.019 
(-2.61) 
-0.019 
(-2.65) 
-0.058 
(-2.44) 
-0.030 
(-3.18) 
-0.008 
(-0.85) 
-0.010 
(-1.07) 
-0.013 
(-0.31) 
-0.025 
(-1.87) 
-0.015 
(-2.96) 
-0.016 
(-3.22) 
-0.031 
(-1.51) 
-0.027 
(-3.60) 
-0.004 
(-0.34) 
-0.005 
(-0.50) 
0.165 
(3.83) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
2m  -0.46 (0.54) 
-0.328 
(0.74) 
-1.433 
(0.15) 
0.809 
(0.42) 
0.185 
(0.85) 
0.013 
(0.98) 
-2.174 
(0.03) 
0.707 
(0.48) 
0.303 
(0.76) 
0.715 
(0.47) 
0.84 
(0.93) 
-0.025 
(0.98) 
-0.52 
(0.61) 
-0.752 
(0.45) 
-0.949 
(0.34) 
-0.471 
(0.64) 
Sargan 25.60 
(0.27) 
27.45 
(0.19) 
28.59 
(0.17) 
23.00 
(0.40) 
23.85 
(0.36) 
26.03 
(0.25) 
33.25 
(0.06) 
23.30 
(0.38) 
22.79 
(0.41) 
23.30 
(0.38) 
22.91 
(0.41) 
20.50 
(0.55) 
24.67 
(0.31) 
26.11 
(0.25) 
38.58 
(0.02) 
24.52 
(0.32) 
obs. 62 63 47 59 62 63 47 59 62 63 47 59 62 63 47 59 
 
Notes: 1. The estimates are obtained using the Arellano – Bond (1991) one-step GMM estimator. 2. The sample period used for estimation is the four 5-
year periods in 1980-2000. 3. Time dummies are included for each period in all equations. 4. gdppc is treated as predetermined and two lags are used as 
instruments. govexp is treated as endogenous and up to two lags are used as instruments. 34 instruments are used in total for each estimation. 5. z-
statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 6. 2m is the statistic proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for second order serial 
correlation in the residuals of the first-differenced equations. This is distributed as standard normal. The p-value is reported in parenthesis below the test 
statistic.  7. The Sargan statistic tests for over-identifying restrictions.  This is distributed as 222χ , where the degrees of freedom are given as the number 
of instruments minus the number of regressors. The p-value is reported in parenthesis below the test statistic.   
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Table 2: The effect of ideology on the tax structure: Levels of tax rates, 5 year averages for 
1970-2000 (GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
 
letr litr ketn kitn ketg kitg cetr citr 
ideowold 0.133 
(0.71) 
0.055 
(0.27) 
1.221 
(1.93) 
0.540 
(1.53) 
0.431 
(1.82) 
0.402 
(2.07) 
0.368 
(1.81) 
0.271 
(2.12) 
lag tax rate 0.344 
(1.72) 
0.299 
(1.56) 
0.338 
(0.23) 
0.182 
(1.01) 
-0.032 
(0.16) 
0.236 
(1.16) 
0.523 
(2.55) 
0.692 
(3.35) 
gdppc 0.227 
(1.72) 
-0.075 
(-0.40) 
-1.704 
(-2.63) 
0.349 
(0.94) 
-0.627 
(-2.71) 
-0.235 
(-1.11) 
0.030 
(0.14) 
0.036 
(0.24) 
govexp 0.167 
(2.00) 
0.177 
(1.98) 
-0.075 
(-0.28) 
0.181 
(1.07) 
-0.195 
(-2.01) 
-0.009 
(-0.10) 
-0.214 
(-2.10) 
-0.126 
(-1.95) 
capopeness -0.005 
(-0.12) 
-0.023 
(-0.52) 
0.278 
(2.18) 
0.099 
(1.43) 
0.140 
(3.24) 
0.078 
(2.12) 
0.035 
(0.86) 
0.023 
(0.92) 
population 1.740 
(0.03) 
3.775 
(0.07) 
196.67 
(1.15) 
-10.87 
(-0.11) 
-52.38 
(-0.87) 
-19.09 
(-0.36) 
-13.37 
(-0.24) 
2.672 
(0.08) 
agedep -9.256 
(-0.91) 
-7.904 
(-0.73) 
-10.45 
(-0.32) 
-6.827 
(-0.34) 
2.329 
(0.18) 
1.112 
(0.08) 
-0.172 
(-0.02) 
-1.033 
(-0.15) 
urban 0.165 
(1.92) 
0.182 
(2.04) 
0.346 
(1.18) 
0.155 
(0.95) 
0.067 
(0.65) 
0.051 
(0.56) 
-0.023 
(-0.22) 
-0.056 
(-0.83) 
2m  0.417 (0.68) 
1.012 
(0.31) 
-0.587 
(0.56) 
0.121 
(0.90) 
-0.642 
(0.52) 
0.067 
(0.95) 
-0.879 
(0.38) 
-0.778 
(0.44) 
Sargan 26.20 
(0.24) 
26.30 
(0.24) 
20.76 
(0.53) 
26.96 
(0.21) 
24.38 
(0.33) 
26.66 
(0.22) 
29.19 
(0.13) 
27.23 
(0.20) 
obs. 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
 
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3: The effect of different measures of ideology on the tax structure: Levels of tax 
rates, 5 year averages for 1970-2000 (GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
letr litr Ketn kitn Ketg kitg cetr citr obs. 
ideowold 0.133 
(0.71) 
0.055 
(0.27) 
1.221 
(1.93) 
0.540 
(1.53) 
0.431 
(1.82) 
0.402 
(2.07) 
0.368 
(1.81) 
0.271 
(2.12) 
62 
ideotav 0.049 
(0.27) 
-0.034 
(-0.17) 
1.143 
(1.78) 
0.548 
(1.48) 
0.297 
(1.32) 
0.376 
(1.96) 
0.415 
(2.05) 
0.270 
(2.13) 
63 
ideocm -0.202 
(--0.86) 
-0.139 
(-0.58) 
-0.973 
(-1.21) 
-0.731 
(-1.65) 
-0.627 
(-2.59) 
-0.672 
(-3.09) 
-0.377 
(-1.55) 
-0.263 
(-1.80) 
47 
ideocus 0.219 
(0.47) 
 0.460 
(0.92) 
-1.609 
(-0.98) 
-0.650 
(-0.72) 
-0.976 
(-1.77) 
-0.867 
(-1.83) 
-1.082 
(-2.15) 
-0.783 
(-2.50) 
59 
 
Notes: Below each tax rate, we report the coefficient of the measure of ideology obtained from a 
regression of the form of the relevant column in Table 2. 
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Table 4: The effect of ideology on the tax structure: Ratios of tax rates, annual data 1970-2000 (fixed effects estimation) 
 
 
 
ratio1 ratio1 ratio1 ratio1 ratio2 ratio2 ratio2 ratio2 ratio3 ratio3 ratio3 ratio3 ratio4 ratio4 ratio4 ratio4 
ideowold -0.014 
(-3.24) 
   -0.016 
(-2.81) 
   -0.005 
(-1.38) 
   -0.006 
(-1.05) 
   
ideotav  -0.012 
(-2.92) 
   -0.013 
(-2.46) 
   -0.006 
(-1.69) 
   -0.006 
(-1.02) 
  
ideocm   0.005 
(1.42) 
   0.013 
(2.21) 
   0.002 
(0.64) 
   0.017 
(2.53) 
 
ideocus    0.017 
(1.73) 
   0.022 
(1.70) 
   0.003 
(0.44) 
   0.004 
(0.30) 
lag ratio 0.771 
(23.28) 
0.790 
(25.04) 
0.833 
(26.56) 
0.774 
(20.76) 
0.816 
(26.65) 
0.821 
(29.02) 
0.841 
(27.02) 
0.822 
(23.80) 
0.712 
(19.87) 
0.736 
(21.77) 
0.703 
(16.54) 
0.713 
(17.87) 
0.800 
(24.85) 
0.816 
(27.73) 
0.808 
(20.34) 
0.829 
(23.26) 
gdppc -0.001 
(-0.81) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.94) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.001 
(1.33) 
0.001 
(0.71) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
0.001 
(1.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
0.001 
(1.42) 
0.001 
(1.99) 
0.001 
(1.14) 
0.001 
(1.01) 
govexp 0.001 
(0.64) 
0.003 
(1.39) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
0.003 
(1.14) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
0.002 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
-0.004 
(-1.30) 
capopeness -0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-1.02) 
-0.001 
(-1.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.47) 
-0.001 
(-1.44) 
-0.002 
(-1.75) 
-0.001 
(-1.02) 
-0.001 
(-1.29) 
-0.001 
(-1.94) 
-0.001 
(-0.72) 
-0.001 
(-1.50) 
-0.001 
(-1.56) 
-0.002 
(-2.31) 
-0.002 
(-1.97) 
-0.001 
(-1.86) 
population 0.001 
(0.75) 
0.001 
(1.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.001 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.78) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
0.001 
(1.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.001 
(1.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
agedep 0.241 
(0.88) 
0.166 
(0.67) 
0.013 
(0.06) 
0.364 
(1.26) 
0.177 
(0.48) 
0.064 
(0.20) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.365 
(0.94) 
-0.119 
(-0.53) 
-0.136 
(-0.68) 
-0.400 
(-1.95) 
-0.012 
(-0.05) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
-0.157 
(-0.48) 
-0.323 
(-0.90) 
0.218 
(0.57) 
urban -0.010 
(-3.67) 
-0.006 
(-2.71) 
0.002 
(0.34) 
-0.011 
(-2.67) 
-0.007 
(-2.22) 
-0.004 
(-1.40) 
0.004 
(0.53) 
-0.010 
(-1.82) 
-0.007 
(-3.47) 
-0.005 
(-2.82) 
-0.012 
(-2.20) 
-0.007 
(-2.12) 
-0.006 
(-1.72) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
0.013 
(1.23) 
-0.009 
(-1.59) 
R2 0.91 0.94 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.79 0.85 0.32 0.77 0.91 0.92 0.36 0.88 
obs. 387 420 313 372 387 420 313 372 387 420 313 372 387 420 313 372 
 
Notes: 1. The estimates are obtained by fixed effects estimation. 2. The sample period used for estimation is 1971-2000. 3. Time dummies are included 
for each period in all equations. 4. t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient.   
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Table 5: The effect of ideology on the tax structure: Levels of tax rates, annual data 1970-
2000 (fixed effects estimation) 
 
 
 
 
letr litr ketn kitn ketg kitg cetr citr 
ideowold -0.005 
(0.13) 
-0.037 
(-0.79) 
0.366 
(1.21) 
0.194 
(2.16) 
0.046 
(0.77) 
0.079 
(1.68) 
0.140 
(2.84) 
0.091 
(3.03) 
lag tax rate 0.819 
(26.87) 
0.855 
(28.88) 
0.521 
(11.62) 
0.748 
(21.24) 
0.752 
(23.56) 
0.798 
(24.60) 
0.770 
(23.55) 
0.768 
(23.88) 
gdppc 0.001 
(1.61) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
0.001 
(2.54) 
-0.001 
(-1.57) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
govexp 0.082 
(3.87) 
0.075 
(3.41) 
0.051 
(0.36) 
0.043 
(1.00) 
0.037 
(1.34) 
0.036 
(1.68) 
-0.037 
(-1.60) 
-0.018 
(-1.28) 
capopeness -0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
0.041 
(0.80) 
0.015 
(1.01) 
0.014 
(1.43) 
0.012 
(1.61) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.50) 
population -0.001 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
-0.001 
(-1.43) 
-0.001 
(-1.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
-0.001 
(-1.50) 
-0.001 
(-1.34) 
agedep -0.357 
(-0.13) 
1.047 
(0.36) 
12.193 
(0.64) 
-0.614 
(-0.11) 
-0.513 
(-0.14) 
-1.032 
(-0.35) 
2.876 
(0.91) 
1.201 
(0.63) 
urban 0.031 
(1.12) 
0.023 
(0.81) 
0.339 
(1.77) 
0.113 
(2.02) 
0.113 
(3.01) 
0.046 
(1.59) 
0.029 
(0.94) 
0.012 
(0.63) 
obs. 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 
 
Notes: See notes in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: The effect of different measures of ideology on the tax structure: Levels of tax 
rates, annual data 1970-2000 (fixed effects estimation) 
 
 
 
letr litr ketn kitn Ketg kitg cetr citr obs. 
ideowold -0.005 
(0.13) 
-0.037 
(-0.79) 
0.366 
(1.21) 
0.194 
(2.16) 
0.046 
(0.77) 
0.079 
(1.68) 
0.140 
(2.84) 
0.091 
(3.03) 
387 
ideotav 0.011 
(0.25) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
0.358 
(1.27) 
0.164 
(1.96) 
0.087 
(1.54) 
0.073 
(1.66) 
0.145 
(3.01) 
0.091 
(3.08) 
420 
ideocm 0.006 
(0.11) 
0.036 
(0.64) 
-0.251 
(-0.65) 
-0.195 
(-1.69) 
-0.132 
(-1.96) 
-0.126 
(-2.23) 
-0.197 
(-3.26) 
-0.122 
(-3.40) 
313 
ideocus -0.069 
(-0.75) 
-0.035 
(-0.36) 
-0.525 
(-0.78) 
-0.368 
(-1.86) 
-0.116 
(-0.89) 
-0.175 
(-1.71) 
-0.221 
(-2.03) 
-0.145 
(-2.18) 
372 
 
Notes: Below each tax rate, we report the coefficient of the measure of ideology obtained from a 
regression of the form of the relevant column in Table 5. 
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Table 7: The effect of electoral uncertainty on tax-spending policies – annual data 1970-2000 (fixed effects estimation) 
 
 
Notes: 1. The estimates are obtained by fixed effects estimation. 2. The sample period used for estimation is 1971-2000. 3. Time dummies are included 
for each period in all equations. 4. t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
litr litr Kitn kitn kitg kitg letr letr ketn ketn ketg ketg citr citr 
elections -0.384 
(-2.84) 
-0.373 
(-2.82) 
-0.462 
(-1.78) 
-0.515 
(-2.01) 
-0.299 
(-2.28) 
-0.312 
(-2.41) 
-0.366 
(-2.93) 
-0.368 
(-3.01) 
-0.674 
(-0.75) 
-0.795 
(-0.91) 
-0.338 
(-1.94) 
-0.233 
(-1.21) 
-0.098 
(-1.11) 
-0.147 
(-1.66) 
ideowold -0.046 
(-0.99) 
 0.183 
(2.04) 
 0.071 
(1.53) 
 -0.013 
(-0.32) 
 0.351 
(1.15) 
 0.038 
(0.64) 
 0.089 
(2.95) 
 
lag 
dependent 
0.858 
(29.26) 
0.853 
(29.92) 
0.750 
(21.36) 
0.770 
(22.99) 
0.800 
(24.81) 
0.817 
(27.70) 
0.820 
(27.22) 
0.820 
(28.24) 
0.521 
(11.63) 
0.537 
(12.30) 
0.753 
(23.69) 
0.746 
(22.19) 
0.768 
(23.90) 
0.798 
(25.74) 
gdppc 
 
0.001 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
0.001 
(2.49) 
0.001 
(2.32) 
0.001 
(0.60) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(1.57) 
0.001 
(1.59) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
-0.001 
(-1.27) 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
-0.001 
(-1.26) 
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
govexp 
 
0.079 
(3.63) 
0.080 
(3.70) 
0.047 
(1.10) 
0.059 
(1.38) 
0.039 
(1.83) 
0.043 
(2.02) 
0.086 
(4.08) 
0.089 
(4.26) 
0.058 
(0.41) 
0.103 
(0.73) 
0.041 
(1.49) 
0.048 
(1.59) 
-0.017 
(-1.20) 
-0.007 
(-0.55) 
capopeness 
 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
0.148 
(1.00) 
0.014 
(0.96) 
0.012 
(1.61) 
0.011 
(1.57) 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
0.040 
(0.80) 
0.044 
(0.88) 
0.014 
(1.42) 
0.016 
(1.53) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
population 
 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.37) 
-0.001 
(-1.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.76) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.95) 
-0.001 
(0.84) 
-0.001 
(-1.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.89) 
agedep 
 
1.083 
(0.38) 
1.097 
(0.39) 
-0.538 
(-0.10) 
-1.058 
(-0.19) 
-0.947 
(-0.33) 
-0.732 
(-0.25) 
-0.307 
(-0.12) 
-0.572 
(-0.22) 
12.230 
(0.64) 
7.489 
(0.40) 
-0.475 
(-0.13) 
-0.372 
(-0.09) 
1.204 
(0.63) 
0.560 
(0.29) 
urban 
 
0.018 
(0.65) 
0.014 
(0.54) 
0.107 
(1.91) 
0.080 
(1.50) 
0.041 
(1.46) 
0.029 
(1.06) 
0.025 
(0.96) 
0.019 
(0.76) 
0.331 
(1.72) 
0.276 
(1.50) 
0.109 
(2.91) 
0.028 
(0.72) 
0.010 
(0.56) 
0.004 
(0.22) 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.58 0.64 0.81 0.81 0.97 0.97 
obs. 387 395 387 395 387 395 387 395 387 395 387 395 387 395 
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Table 7 (continued): The effect of electoral uncertainty on tax-spending policies – annual data 1970-2000 (fixed effects 
estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cetr cetr ratio1 ratio1 ratio2 ratio2 ratio3 ratio3 ratio4 ratio4 
Elections -0.192 
(-1.32) 
-0.263 
(-1.82) 
0.026 
(2.13) 
0.019 
(1.49) 
0.029 
(1.80) 
0.022 
(1.28) 
0.011 
(1.07) 
0.008 
(0.76) 
0.016 
(0.98) 
0.006 
(0.36) 
Ideowold 0.136 
(2.75) 
 -0.013 
(-3.11) 
 -0.015 
(-2.70) 
 -0.004 
(-1.31) 
 -0.005 
(-0.97) 
 
lag 
dependent 
0.771 
(23.60) 
0.794 
(25.11) 
0.771 
(23.42) 
0.773 
(22.71) 
0.817 
(26.75) 
0.819 
(26.46) 
0.713 
(19.90) 
0.694 
(19.36) 
0801 
(24.87) 
0.798 
(24.25) 
gdppc 
 
0.001 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.69) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(1.44) 
0.001 
(1.20) 
govexp 
 
-0.034 
(-1.50) 
-0.020 
(-0.86) 
0.001 
(0.50) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.68) 
capopeness 
 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.000 
(-0.47) 
-0.000 
(-0.32) 
-0.000 
(-1.28) 
-0.000 
(-1.13) 
-0.001 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-1.55) 
population 
 
-0.001 
(-1.46) 
-0.001 
(-1.08) 
0.001 
(0.68) 
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
agedep 
 
2.872 
(0.91) 
1.771 
(0.56) 
0.238 
(0.87) 
0.268 
(0.91) 
0.173 
(0.47) 
0.204 
(0.52) 
-0.119 
(-0.54) 
-0.118 
(-0.52) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.028 
(-0.08) 
urban 
 
0.027 
(0.86) 
0.016 
(0.52) 
-0.009 
(-3.56) 
-0.008 
(-3.04) 
-0.007 
(-2.12) 
-0.006 
(-1.86) 
-0.007 
(-3.39) 
-0.007 
(-3.51) 
-0.006 
(-1.66) 
-0.002 
(-0.54) 
R2 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.78 0.79 0.92 0.93 
obs. 387 395 387 395 387 395 387 395 387 395 
